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We’d first like to thank Dr. Zagzebski for engaging with our review of Epistemic Authority. We 
want to extend the dialogue by offering brief comments on several issues that she raised. 
 
Conscientiousness 
 
In our review we brought up the case of a grieving father who simply could not believe that 
his son had died despite conclusive evidence to the contrary. This case struck us as a 
problem case for Zagzebki’s account of rationality. For Zagzebski, rationality is a matter of 
conscientiousness, and conscientiousness is a matter of using your faculties as best you can 
to get to truth, where the best guide for a belief’s truth is its surviving conscientious 
reflection. The problem raised by the grieving father is that his belief that his son is still alive 
will continuously survive his conscientious reflection (since he is psychologically incapable of 
believing otherwise) yet it is clearly an irrational belief. In her response, Zagzebski makes the 
following claims,  
 
A. “To say he has reasons to believe his son is dead is just to say that a 
conscientiously self-reflective person would treat what he hears, reads, sees as 
indicators of the truth of his son’s death. So I say that a reason just is what a 
conscientiously self-reflective person sees as indicating the truth of some 
belief.” (57) 
 
and, 
 
B. “a conscientious judgment can never go against the balance of one’s 
reasons since one’s reasons for p just are what one conscientiously judges 
indicate the truth of p.” (57) 
 
These claims about the case lead to a dilemma. Either conscientiousness is to be understood 
subjectively or objectively, and either way we see some issues. First, if we understand 
conscientiousness subjectively, then the father seems to pass the test. We can suppose that 
he is doing the best he can to believe truths, but the psychological stability of this one belief 
causes the dissonance to be resolved in atypical ways. So, on a subjective construal of 
conscientiousness, he is conscientious and his belief about his son has survived 
conscientious reflection.  
 
We can stipulate that the father is doing the best he can with what he has, yet his belief is 
irrational. Zagzebski’s (B) above seems to fit a subjective understanding of conscientiousness 
and leads to such a verdict. This is also how we read her in Epistemic Authority more generally. 
Second, if we understand conscientiousness objectively, then it follows that the father is not 
being conscientious. There are objectively better ways to resolve his psychic dissonance even 
if they are not psychologically open to him.  
 
So, the objective understanding of conscientiousness does not give the verdict that the 
grieving father is rational. Zagzebski’s (A) above fits with an objective understanding of 
conscientiousness. The problem with the objective understanding of conscientiousness is 
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that it is much harder to get a grasp on what it is. Doing the best you can with what you 
have, has a clear meaning on the subjective level and gives a nice responsibilist account of 
conscientiousness. However, when we abstract away from the subject’s best efforts and the 
subject’s faculties, how should we understand conscientiousness? Is it to believe in 
accordance with what an ideal epistemic agent would conscientiously believe?  
 
To us, while the objective understanding of conscientiousness avoids the problem, it comes 
with new problems, chief among which is a fleshed out concept of conscientiousness, so 
understood. In addition, the objective construal of conscientiousness also does not appear to 
be suited for how Zagzebski deploys the concept in other areas of the book. For instance, 
regarding her treatment of peer disagreement, Zagzebski claims that each party should 
resolve the dissonance in a way that favors what they trust most when thinking 
conscientiously about the matter. The conscientiousness in play here sounds quite subjective, 
since rational resolution is simply a matter of sticking with what one trusts the most (even if 
an ideal rational agent wouldn’t be placing their trust in the same states and even when 
presented evidence to the contrary).  
 
Reasons 
 
Zagzebski distinguishes between 1st and 3rd person reasons, in part, to include things like 
emotions as reasons. For Zagzebski, 
 
“1st person or deliberative reasons are states of mind that indicate to me that 
some belief is true. 3rd person, or theoretical reasons, are not states of mind, 
but are propositions that are logically or probabilistically connected to the 
truth of some proposition. (What we call evidence is typically in this 
category)” (57) 
 
We are troubled by the way that Zagzebski employs this distinction. First, it is not clear how 
these two kinds of reasons are related. Does a subject have a 1st person reason for every 3rd 
person reason? After all, not every proposition that is logically or probabilistically connected 
to the truth of a proposition is part of an individuals evidence or is one of their reasons. So, 
are the 3rd person reasons that one possesses reasons that one has access to by way of a first-
person reason? How could a 3rd person reason be a reason that I have if not by way of some 
subjective connection?  
 
The relation between these two kinds of reasons deserves further development since 
Zagzebski puts this distinction to a great deal of work in the book. The second issue results 
from Zagzebski’s claim that, “1st person and 3rd person reasons do not aggregate.” (57)  If 
1st and 3rd person reasons do not aggregate, then they do not combine to give a verdict as to 
what one has all-things-considered reason to believe. This poses a significant problem in 
cases where one’s 1st and 3rd person reasons point in different directions.  
 
Zagzebski’s focus is on one’s 1st person reasons, but what then of one’s 3rd person reasons? 
3rd person reasons are still reasons, yet if they do not aggregate with 1st person reasons, and 
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1st person reasons are determining what one should believe, it’s hard to see what work is left 
for 3rd person reasons. This is quite striking since these are the very reasons epistemologists 
have focused on for centuries.  
 
Zagzebski’s embrace of 1st person reasons is ostensibly a movement to integrate the 
concepts of rationality and truth with resolutely human faculties (e.g. emotion, belief, and 
sense-perception) that have largely been ignored by the Western philosophical canon. Her 
critical attitude toward Western hyper-intellectualism and the rationalist worldview is 
understandable and, in certain ways, admirable. Perhaps the movement to engage emotion, 
belief, and sense-perception as epistemic features can be preserved, but only in the broader 
context of an evidence-centered epistemology. Further research should channel this 
movement toward an examination of how non-traditional epistemic faculties as 1st person 
reasons may be mapped to 3rd person reasons in a way is cognizant of self-trust in personal 
experience —that is, an account of aggregation that is grounded fundamentally in evidence. 
 
Biases  
 
In the final part of her response, Zagzebski claims that the insight regarding prejudice within 
communities can bolster several of her points. She refers specifically to her argument that 
epistemic self-trust commits us to epistemic trust in others (and its expansion to 
communities), as well as her argument about communal epistemic egoism and the Rational 
Recognition Principle. She emphasizes the importance of communities to regard others as 
trustworthy and rational, which would lead to the recognition of biases within them—
something that would not happen if communities relied on epistemic egoism.  
 
However, biases have staying power beyond egoism. Even those who are interested in 
widening and deepening their perspective though engaging with others can nevertheless have 
deep biases that affect how they integrate this information. Although Zagzebski may be right 
in emphasizing the importance of communities to act in this way, it seems too idealistic to 
imply that such honest engagement would result in the recognition and correction of biases. 
While such engagement might highlight important disagreements, Zagzebski’s analysis of 
disagreement, where it is rational to stick with what you trust most, will far too often be an 
open invitation to maintain (if not reinforce) one’s own biases and prejudice. 
 
It is also important to note that the worry concerning biases and prejudice cannot be 
resolved by emphasizing a move to communities given that communities are subject to the 
same biases and prejudices as individuals that compose them. Individuals, in trusting their 
own communities, will only reinforce the biases and prejudice of its members. So, this move 
can make things worse, even if sometimes it can make things better. Zagzebski’s expansion 
of self-trust to communities and her Rational Recognition Principle commits communities 
only to recognize others as (prima facie) trustworthy and rational by means of recognizing 
their own epistemic faculties in those others.  
 
However, doing this does not do much in terms of the disclosure of biases given that 
communities are not committed to trust the beliefs of those they recognize as rational and 
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trustworthy. Under Zagzebski’s view, it is possible for a community to recognize another as 
rational and trustworthy, without necessarily trusting their beliefs—all without the need to 
succumb to communal epistemic egoism. Communities are, then, able to treat disagreement 
in a way that resolves dissonance for them.  
 
That is, by trusting their beliefs more than those of the other communities. This is so even 
when recognizing them as rational and trustworthy as themselves because, under Zagzebski’s 
view communities are justified in maintaining their beliefs over those of others not because 
of egoistic reasons but because by withstanding conscientious self-reflection, they trust their 
beliefs more than those of others. Resolving dissonance from disagreement in this way is 
clearly more detrimental than it is beneficial, especially in the cases of biased individuals and 
communities, for which this would lead them to keep their biases.  
 
Although, as Zagzebski claims, attention to cases of prejudice within communities may help 
give more importance to her argument about the extension of self-trust to the communal 
level, it does not do much in terms of disclosing biases inasmuch as dissonance from 
disagreement is resolved in the way she proposes. Her proposal leads not to the disclosure of 
biases as she implies, but to their reinforcement given that biases—although plausibly 
unaware—is what communities and individuals would trust more in these cases.  
 
Contact details: jonathan.matheson@gmail.com 
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